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RETHINKING THE ADDITUR QUESTION IN
FEDERAL COURTS
INTRODUCTION
The right to trial by jury is an essential characteristic of the federal
court system protected under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States of America.' Unfortunately, today jury trials are
significantly burdensome on litigants, attorneys, and the court system as a
whole. As technological advances and new social issues inevitably alter
the judicial system's landscape, consideration for efficient administration
of justice is important in deciphering the scope of the right to trial by jury.3

See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment, in its entirety, reads:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law.
Id.; see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 431-33 (1996) (citing Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958) (distinguishing federal system of
allocating judge and jury trial functions as independent from state systems).
2 See Jay Tidmarsh, Looking Forward, 1 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 2 (2000) ("One of the
fundamental features of the modem litigation landscape is that trials take longer. This means that
they cost clients more, they consume more attorney and judicial resources, and they tax the
endurance and comprehension of judges and jurors alike."); Fleming James, Jr., Remedies for
Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Verdicts: New Trial on Some or All Issues, Remittitur and
Additur, 1 DUQ. L. REV. 143, 152 (1963) ("[N]ew trials are costly and time consuming and
thereby impose a burden on parties and society.").
3 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN
FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS, reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49, 61 (1995) (stating judicial power includes
responsibility to administer justice "justly, speedily, and economically"); Austin Wakeman Scott,
Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV. 669, 690 (1918) (arguing
functional division between judge and jury must adjust according to administrative needs). In its
preface to recommendations on rules and procedures in the federal courts, the Long Range Plan
states:
[I]t is clear that growing court caseloads, limited resources, emerging technology, and
a changing population will require changes, as yet unclear, in the way justice is
delivered. Given this uncertainty, as well as the lack of relevant data to show the
impact of many possible changes, the federal courts must embrace careful
experimentation and innovation as they and Congress shape the future of the justice
system.
LONG RANGE PLAN, 166 F.D.R. at 117. "Rules of practice, procedure, and evidence for the
federal courts should be adopted and, as needed, revised to promote simplicity in procedure,
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Thus, procedural innovations that alleviate the burdens of modern trials are
encouraged and considered constitutional, provided they do not undermine
the Seventh Amendment's fundamental purpose. 4 One such innovation is
remittitur, which is a procedural alternative to granting a new trial when a
defendant seeks one based on the excessiveness of the verdict. 5 Remittitur
avoids the need for a subsequent trial by conditioning a grant of the
defendant's motion for new trial on the plaintiff's refusal to remit an
amount necessary to cure an excessive award. 6 No such opportunity exists
for plaintiffs seeking similar relief from inadequate verdicts because the
use of additur, remittitur's procedural counterpart, is banned in federal
courts .7

The impermissibility of additur and permissibility of remittitur are
based on the Supreme Court's determination in Dimick v. Schiedt " that
judicially increasing a verdict award violates the Seventh Amendment's
right to trial by jury, while decreasing the verdict does not. 9 In contrast,

many state jurisdictions, unshackled by the Court's interpretation of the
Seventh Amendment,'0 find that their own constitutional protections of the

fairness in administration, and a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of litigation." Id. at
118.
4 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-32, 336-37 (1979) (determining that
collateral estoppel neither increases litigation nor violates Seventh Amendment); Galloway v.
United States, 319 U.S. 372, 389-90 (1943) (holding directed verdict procedure does not violate
Seventh Amendment); Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1931)
(holding constitutional command of Seventh Amendment permits partial new trial); Fid. &
Deposit Co. of Md. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902) (holding summary judgment
prevents use of pleadings to delay just recovery without violating Seventh Amendment). See
generally Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV.
289, 299-320 (1966) (examining patterns of civil practice leading up to ratification of Seventh
Amendment). Henderson concludes that because there was such diversity of civil practice among
the states prior to 1790, the Seventh Amendment must be interpreted as "imposing any but the
most general limitations on the Court's power to make ... procedural changes." Id. at 337.
5 See Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 917 F.2d 1320, 1328 (2d Cir. 1990) (describing
remittitur as choice between new trial and reduction of excessive verdict).
See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text; see also Irene Sann, Remittitur Practice in
the Federal Courts, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 302 (1976) [hereinafter Remittitur Practice]
6

(detailing procedural steps involved in remittitur).
7 See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 482, 487 (1935) (holding Seventh Amendment
forbids federal courts from increasing amount of damages awarded by jury); see also Earl, 917
F.2d at 1331 (noting additur impermissible although it avoids new trial under same theory as
remittitur).
8 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
9 Id. at 486-87 (stating additur compels plaintiff to forgo constitutional right to jury verdict).
The Court in Dimick characterized remittitur as consistent with the Seventh Amendment since it
decreases damages to an amount included in the jury verdict. Id.
10 See Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 (1877) (holding Seventh Amendment limits
powers of federal government only).
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right to trial by jury permit both additur and remittitur.1 The acceptance
and application of additur in state jurisdictions reflects the incongruity and
inefficiency in proscribing one device and not the other. 12 Furthermore, the
specious reasoning and disputed historical foundations on which that
proscription is premised continue to invite questions of why the ban on
additur persists through seventy-five years of federal jurisprudence and
whether it should continue today. 13
This Note will argue that additur, like remittitur, is consistent with
the right to trial by jury. 14 Part II briefly discusses the fundamental
mechanics and procedural effects of additur and remittitur."' Part III
considers additur and remittitur's historical development. 16 Part Ill(A)
discusses the common law precedents leading up to the Dimick decision. 17
Part Ill(B) examines the Dimick decision and Part Ill(C) examines
additur's treatment in various state jurisdictions where it is employed. 8
Part IV reviews the current treatment of additur in federal courts and
subsequent Supreme Court decisions that potentially affect the Dimick
decision. 19 Finally, Part V argues that the asymmetrical treatment of
additur and remittitur in federal court is erroneous and that proscribing
additur is counterproductive.2 ° Specifically, this Note analyzes objections
to the historical foundations and reasoning used to distinguish additur from

11 See, e.g., Jehl v. S. Pac. Co., 427 P.2d 988, 992-93 (Cal. 1967) (holding additur practice
does not violate state constitution); Carney v. Preston, 683 A.2d 47, 54-55 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996)
(same); Freeman v. Wood, 401 N.E.2d 108, 112-13 (Mass. 1980) (same); Genzel v. Halvorson,
80 N.W.2d 854, 859 (Minn. 1957) (same); Drummond v. Mid-West Growers Coop. Corp., 542
P.2d 198, 208 (Nev. 1975) (same); Fisch v. Manger, 130 A.2d 815, 823 (N.J. 1957) (same).
12 See e.g., Freeman, 401 N.E.2d at 111 ("There is no relevant analytic difference between
remittitur and additur."); Drummond, 542 P.2d at 208 ("There is no essential difference between
the procedures appropriate for remittitur and additur."); Carney, 683 A.2d at 55 ("There is no
reasoned basis to distinguish remittitur from additur as a matter of simple logic.").
13 See Irene Deaville Sann, Remittiturs (and Additurs) in the FederalCourts: An Evaluation
with Suggested Alternatives, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 157, 198-218 (1988) (arguing ban on
additur requires elimination of current remittitur practice in federal courts). "[A]dditur is
probably no less constitutional than remittitur, and an additur-type procedure should be available
to plaintiffs to the same extent that a remittitur-type procedure is available to defendents." Id. at
218; Leo Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1942) (questioning
validity of assumption that juries approve lesser amounts included in excessive verdicts); see also
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 433 n.16 (1996) (suggesting Dimick dissent
invites rethinking additur's constitutionality).
14 See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
15 See infra Part II.
16 See infra Part III.
17 See infra Part III.A.
18 See infra Part III.B-C.
19 See infra Part IV.
20 See infra Part V.
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remittitur in the Dimick decision. 21 This Note concludes that additur, as a
modern procedural device, is consistent with the principals of the right to
trial by jury and its continued proscription only inhibits productive
evolution of the civil jury in federal courts. 2 2 Accordingly, this Note urges

reconsideration of the constitutionality of additur in federal courts .23
FUNDAMENTAL MECHANICS OF ADDITUR AND REMITTITUR
The remittitur procedure in federal courts derives from the trial
court's authority to grant a new trial.24 Remittitur occurs in circumstances
where the defendant moves for a new trial alleging that a jury verdict is
legally impermissible because the amount of damages awarded is
excessive. 25 If the trial court finds the verdict amount is so excessive as to

be contrary to the evidence presented at trial, it may order a completely
new trial or a partial new trial limited to the proper assessment of
damages. 26 Provided the sole defect in the verdict is excessiveness, the
remittitur procedure enables the court to condition denial of the defendant's
motion for new trial upon the plaintiff's consent to remit the portion of the
verdict deemed excessive.27 Thus, remittitur provides the parties with an
21 See infa notes 70-85 and accompanying text (examining rationales used to support
different treatment of additur and remittitur).
22 See infra Part VI.
23 Infra Part VI.

24 See FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A) ("The court may, on motion, grant a new trial ...

for any

reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court[.]");
Mooney v. Henderson Portion Pack Co., 339 F.2d 64, 66 (6th Cir. 1964) ("The principle of
remittitur is ancillary to this right of the trial judge to grant a new trial because of the
excessiveness of the jury verdict.").
25 See

11

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL

§ 2815 (2d ed. 2009).
See id. §§ 2807, 2814 (detailing court's power to grant relief from excessive or inadequate

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
26

verdicts); see also Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1931)

(holding partial new trial limited to damages issue does not violate Seventh Amendment). A
court should not order a partial new trial nor remittitur if the excessive verdict is the result of
passion or prejudice because liability determinations may have likewise been infected by
prejudice. See Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 521
(1931) ("[N]o verdict can be permitted to stand which is found to be in any degree the result of
appeals to passion and prejudice. Obviously such means may be quite as effective to beget a
wholly wrong verdict as to produce an excessive one."); Dossett v. First State Bank, 399 F.3d
940, 946-47 (8th Cir. 2005) ("It is 'generally inappropriate,' however, to order only a partial new
trial on the issue of damages when the district court concludes the damages award was motivated
by passion and prejudice." (quoting Sanford v. Crittenden Mem'l Hosp., 141 F.3d 882, 885 (8th
Cir. 1998))). But see Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 536 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1976) (Feinberg,
J., dissenting) (criticizing "common formulation" for remittitur), aff'd per curiam, 429 U.S. 648
(1977).
27 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 25, § 2815; See Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 917
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alternative to enduring a new trial.28
Similarly, additur operates where the amount of damages awarded
by the jury is legally impermissible, but in connection with a plaintiff's
motion for new trial based on the allegation that the amount is inadequate. 29
If the trial court finds the verdict amount so inadequate as to be contrary to
the evidence presented at trial, it can grant a complete or partial new trial.3 0
In federal court, this relief is the only form available, even where the sole
ground for granting a new trial is the verdict's inadequacy. 3 ' In numerous
states, alternative relief is available through additur.3 2 In practice, this
procedure operates by the trial judge conditioning denial of the plaintiff's
motion upon the defendant consenting to an increase in damages by an
33
amount deemed necessary to cure the inadequacy of the jury verdict.
34
trial.
subsequent
a
for
need
the
Thus, additur, like remittitur, avoids

F.2d 1320, 1328 (2d Cir. 1990) (explaining remittitur's process and principal objectives).
Calculating the remittitur amount involves considerations of judicial economy, but should also
"minimize the extent of judicial interference with a matter that is otherwise within the jury's
domain." Id. (citing Donovan, 536 F.2d at 539 (Feinberg, J., dissenting)). Indeed, judicial
determination of the proper remittitur amount is a focal point for much of the criticism lodged at
the remittitur procedure. See Carlin, supra note 13, at 20-21 (criticizing arguments in support of
remittitur as artificially minimizing importance of determining damage amount); Sann, supra note
13, at 205 ("When a trial judge orders remittitur on a factual rather than legal basis, he is
substituting his own evaluation of the facts for that of the jury."); Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining
the Constitutionalityof Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 736-47
(2003) (arguing judicial determination of proper damage amount unconstitutionally compels
plaintiffs to forego a new trial).
28 See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 25, § 2815; see also Seltzner v. RDK Corp.,
756 F.2d 51, 52 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (holding plaintiff's refusal to accept remittitur
operates as order for new trial); Evans v. Calmar S.S. Co., 534 F.2d 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1976)
("[R]emittitur frequently provides the means for ending the case by acceptance of the remittitur
and payment of the judgment. The trouble and expense of a new trial are therefore eliminated.").
29 See generally Albert C. Bender, Additur The Power of the Trial Court to Deny a New
Trial on the Condition that Damages be Increased, 3 CAL. W. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1967) (describing
typical situations involving employment of additur and remittitur); Carlin, supra note 13, at 1
(same).
30 See FED R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1) (authorizing grant of new trial "on all or some of
the issues");
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 25, § 2807 (detailing court's authority relative to jury's
damage award).
31 See infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text (discussing proscription of additur in federal
courts).
32 See infa notes 53-62 and accompanying text (discussing state courts' treatment of
additur).
33 See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 25, § 2816 (outlining additur procedure used
in
state courts).
34 See Jehl v. S. Pac. Co., 427 P.2d 988, 995 (Cal. 1967) (en banc) ("Like its fraternal twin
remittitur... [additur] promotes economy and efficiency in judicial proceedings.").
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ADDITUR AND REMITTITUR
Common Law Origins

Since both remittitur and additur are procedural corollaries of new
trial motions, the historical development of each is grounded in the trial
court's power to remedy defects in a jury verdict by granting a new trial.3 5
However, the common law practice of granting a new trial for excessive
damages emerged separately and earlier than the new trial remedy for
inadequate damages.36 At the time the Federal Constitution was adopted in
1791, English trial courts made little use of remittitur and the additur
procedure was nonexistent.3 7 Remittitur and additur each developed later
35 See Jeffrey Cole, Comment, Additur

ProceduralBoon or Constitutional Calamity, 17
DEPAUL L. REV. 175, 181 (1967) ("This power [to grant a conditional new trial] emanated both
as a necessary antecedent and inevitable consequence from [the courts'] common law
discretionary power to set aside an excessive or inadequate verdict.").

36 See Wood v. Gunston, (1655) 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (K.B.) 867 (setting aside jury verdict on
grounds of excessive damages); Bender, supra note 29, at 5 ("Apparently, a new trial on the
ground of inadequacy of damages was not granted in an action for personal injury in England
until 1879."). The disparate historical treatment of inadequate and excessive damages is partially
attributable to the ancient procedure for obtaining a new jury trial, the attaint, which was limited
to remedying excessive verdicts. See id.; Cole, supra note 35, at 178 (describing historical
treatment of inadequate damages by courts).

37 See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 495 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting) ([R]emittitur

had received some recognition in the English courts. But in no recorded case does it appear that
any English judge had considered the possibility of denying a new trial where the defendant had
consented to increase the amount of recovery." (citations omitted)); Sunray Oil Corp. v.
Allbritton, 187 F.2d 475, 477-83 (5th Cir. 1951) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting new trial
motions were made to appellate, not trial court prior to Seventh Amendment); Dorsey v. Barba,
240 P.2d 604, 610-11 (Cal. 1952) (Traynor, J., concurring and dissenting) (interpreting preconstitutional cases as reflecting judicial reluctance to grant new trials for excessive damages),

overruled by Jehl v. S. Pac. Co., 427 P.2d 988 (Cal. 1967).
At the time of the American Revolution, the jury's determination of the amount of
damages in contract actions and in certain tort actions involving property was subject
to judicial supervision through the granting of new trials; in tort actions involving
interests in personality, however, the courts rarely interfered with the amount of the
jury's verdict .... Thus, in 1764, in a case involving trespass and false imprisonment,
the Court of Common Pleas reviewed the earlier decisions and, in a unanimous
opinion, said: 'Weare now come to the case in 1 Stra. 691, Chambers v. Robinson,
which seems to be the only case where ever a new trial was granted merely for the
excessiveness of damages only ....[T]here is not one single case (that is law) in all the
books to be found, where the Court has granted a new trial for excessive damages in
actions for torts.'
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Beardmore v. Carrington, (1764) 95 Eng. Rep. 790 (K.B.) 793;);
see also Freeman v. Wood, 401 N.E.2d 108, 110 & n.8 (Mass. 1980) (citing cases with detailed
discussions on historical background of remittiturs and additurs); Michael H. Cardozo, Note and
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in American jurisprudence during the nineteenth and twentieth century.38
The leading case on remittitur is an 1822 decision by Justice Story in which
he found the procedure constitutionally permissible, albeit hesitantly.39
Judicial use of additur, however, did not appear in an unadulterated form
until almost the end of the nineteenth century.40
Treatment in FederalCourts: Dimick v. Schiedt
In 1935, for the first and only time, the Supreme Court of the
United States directly considered the constitutional validity of additur in
Dimick v. Schiedt.41 The Court, in a five-to-four decision, condemned
additur as an unconstitutional reexamination of the jury verdict in violation
of the plaintiff s Seventh Amendment rights.42 Although the case involved
only an additur order by the district court judge, the inescapable analogy to
remittitur, along with a century's worth of remittitur use in federal courts,
compelled the Court to also address the constitutionality of remittitur.43
With significant deference to stare decisis, the majority begrudgingly
surmised that remittitur was constitutionally permissible .44 Remittitur was

Query, A Word is Born: Additur, 1934 , 2 SCRIBES J. LEG. WRITING 143, 143-44 (1991)
(identifying anonymous 1934 author as initial source of "additur" term).
38 See Brad Snyder, Protecting the Afediafrom Excessive Damages: The Nineteenth -Century
Origins of Remittitur and Its' Modern Application in Food Lion, 24 VT. L. REv. 299, 305-08
(2000) (reviewing historical origins with focus on nineteenth century origins of remittitur).
39 Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760, 761-62 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578) (holding trial court
may forgo new trial for excessive damages if plaintiff willfully remits excess). Prefacing his
approval of remittitur, Justice Story stated "I have the greatest hesitation in interfering with the
verdict, and in so doing, I believe that I go to the very limits of the law." Id. at 762. Despite
Justice Story's hesitation, by 1889, remittitur practice progressed to the point that its
constitutionality was nearly self-evident. See Ark. Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S.
69, 74 (1889) ("The [remittitur] practice ... is sustained by sound reason, and does not, in any
just sense, impair the constitutional right of trial by jury.").
40 See generally Volker v. First Nat'l Bank, 42 N.W. 732, 733 (Neb. 1889) (affirming additur
order involving trial court's assessment of proper amount of unascertainable or unliquidated
damages); Carr v. Miner, 1866 WL 4664, at *8 (111. April, 1866) (approving additur as remedy for
jury miscalculation of liquidated damages).
41 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
42 Id. at 486-87 (concluding that conditioning denial of new trial on defendant's consent
deprives plaintiff of constitutional right).
43 Id. at 482 ("We could well rest this opinion upon that conclusion, were it not for the
contention that our federal courts from a very early day have upheld the authority of a trial court
to deny a motion for new trial because damages were found to be excessive .... "). The Court
notoriously suggests that remittitur likewise violates the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 484; see
also Thomas, supra note 27, at 790 (arguing constitutionality of remittitur undecided because
discussion in Dimick technically dicta).
44 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 484-85 (speculating that remittitur violates Seventh Amendment). In
light of Blunt v. Little and the ensuing hundred years of remittitur's acceptance and application in
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distinguished from additur on two grounds: first, remittitur, not additur,
was recognized at common law prior to adoption of the Constitution; 45 and,
second, remittitur judicially decreases a verdict to an amount already
passed on by the jury, whereas additur is a "bald addition46 of something
which in no sense can be said to be included in the verdict. ,
The dissent in Dimick, authored by Justice Stone and joined by
Justices Brandeis and Cardozo, vigorously refutes the majority's historical
arguments, maintaining that proper historical and textual analysis of the
Seventh Amendment suggests that its only purpose was "to preserve the
essentials of the jury trial as it was known to the common law before the
adoption of the Constitution., 47
Justice Stone considered this a
constitutional guarantee that parties have the benefits of submitting factual
issues to a jury, but not a blueprint for how these benefits must be
obtained. 48 Thus interpreted, the Seventh Amendment does not proscribe

federal courts, the majority speculates that "the doctrine would not be reconsidered or disturbed at
this late day."

Id. at 458; see also Remittitur Practice, supra note 6, at 301 (inferring from

Court's deference that reconsideration of remittitur's constitutionality is unlikely). The dubious
manner in which the Court recognizes remittitur evokes the inconsistency in its analysis. See
Carney v. Preston, 683 A.2d 47, 51 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) ([S]ince the Court majority viewed
the additur question as whether 'a doubtful [remittitur] precedent [should be] extended by mere
analogy,' the Court was forced to come up with a reason which grudgingly permitted remittitur
while condemning additur." (alterations in original) (quoting Dimick, 293 U.S. at 486)).
45 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 484-85 ("[T]he doctrine ... finds some support in the practice of the
English courts prior to the adoption of the Constitution .
).
46 Id. at 486.
47 Id. at 490 (Stone, J., dissenting). Expounding further upon the underlying purpose of the
Seventh Amendment, the dissent argues that its language, "in suits at common law," serves to
distinguish the essentials of a jury trial in actions at law from suits in equity and admiralty and
was not intended to eternally freeze trial practice as it existed in 1791. Id. at 490-91. The dissent
maintains that this is not a novel interpretation of the text. Id. at 490-91 (citing Parsons v.
Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830)) (stating initially Seventh Amendment language regarded as
distinguishing actions at law from equity and admiralty). Moreover, the Court in Parsonsnoted:
By common law, [the framers of the Seventh Amendment] meant what the constitution
denominated in the third article 'law;' not merely suits, which the common law
recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were
to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights
alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered; or where, as in the
admiralty, a mixture of public law, and of maritime law and equity was often found in
the same suit.
Parsons,28 U.S. at 447.
48 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 491 (Stone, J., dissenting) ("The Seventh Amendment guarantees that
suitors in actions at law shall have the benefits of trial of issues of fact by a jury, but it does not
prescribe any particular procedure by which these benefits shall be obtained .... ). Justice Stone
reasons that, since the framers intended the Constitution "to endure for unnumbered generations,"
it follows that the Seventh Amendment is necessarily "concerned with substance and not with
form." Id. at 490. He also notes that the immediate question of constitutionality necessitates an
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49
any particular procedure for dealing with legal defects in jury verdicts .
Justice Stone, therefore, regarded searching among "the legal scrap heap of
a century and a half ago" for remnants of the additur and remittitur
procedures as unproductive.50 Adopting this more flexible interpretation of
the Seventh Amendment, under which the Court had already approved
other modern post-verdict procedures, the dissent concludes that neither
additur nor remittitur intruded upon the jury's essential function."

understated focus on the practical effects of additur. Id. at 489-90. He briefly acknowledges the
advantages and general acceptance of the procedure before responding to the majority's decision:
I address myself to the question of power without stopping to comment on the
generally recognized advantages of the practice as a means of securing substantial
justice and bringing the litigation to a more speedy and economical conclusion than
would be possible by a new trial to a jury, or the extent to which that or analogous
practice has been adopted and found useful in the courts of the several states.
Id. at 490.
49 See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987) (holding Seventh Amendment not
violated by judicial determination of civil penalty amount); Dimick, 293 U.S. at 490.
The defendant was, of course, entitled to have a jury summoned in this case, but that
right was subject to the condition, fundamental in the conduct of civil actions, that the
court may withdraw a case from the jury and direct a verdict, according to the law if
the evidence is uncontradicted and raises only a question of law.
Tull, 481 U.S. at 419 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115
(1909)).
50 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 495 (Stone, J., dissenting). The dissent argues that the majority's rigid
historical approach required "deny[ing] any possibility of change, development, or
improvement," which was contrary to the fundamental common law principle of "capacity for
growth and development" and "adaptability." Id. at 495-96.
51 Id. at 491-95 (arguing constitutional implications same for additur and remittitur). Justice
Stone identified a number of prior decisions where the Court found modem post-verdict
procedures, such as directed verdict and partial new trials, to not infringe on the parties' Seventh
Amendment rights. Id. at 491 (citing cases approving procedures unknown at common law). The
constitutional test gleaned from those decisions was whether or not a procedure "left unimpaired
the function of the jury to decide issues of fact." See id. at 492. He argues that if the trial court's
discretionary power to deny a plaintiff's motion for new trial on grounds of inadequacy does not
encroach upon the jury's function, neither does exercising that discretion in light of a defendant's
consent to additur. Id. Reasoning that the authority to rule damages as inadequate or excessive
logically includes the authority to assess what the proper verdict should be, he found "[t]he fact
that in one case the recovery is less than the amount of the verdict, and that in the other it is
greater, would seem to be without significance." Id. at 493 -94. See generallyBernadette Meyler,
Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REv. 551, 593-600 (2006) (demonstrating
advantages of more flexible interpretation of common law through Seventh Amendment
analysis).
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Treatment in State Courts
Dimick does not preclude state courts from issuing additur orders
52
because the Seventh Amendment restricts the federal government only.
Hence, when analyzing additur's constitutionality under their respective
state constitutions and comparable provisions protecting the right to jury
trial, state courts are often persuaded by the aforementioned reasoning of
the dissent in Dimick. 3 As a result, the highest courts of numerous
jurisdictions have held that additur does not infringe on a plaintiff's
constitutional right to jury determination of damages.5 4 Notably, the
Supreme Court of California, in a widely cited decision endorsing additur,
went so far as to overrule its prior decision that explicitly adopted the
majority's reasoning in Dimick.5 Other jurisdictions with decisions in line
with Dimick have enacted statutes on additur which, at least, temper the
52

See Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 (1877) (holding Seventh Amendment applicable

only to courts of United States); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1875) (holding Seventh
Amendment not incorporated into due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment). In Pearson,
the plaintiff claimed that the compensation for his property being taken for public use was
inadequate, but failed to make the city of Philadelphia a party in the suit. Pearson, 95 U.S. at
294-95. In denying the plaintiff leave to amend the claim, the Court stated that the Pennsylvania
statute providing the cause of action contained "ample provision.., for an inquiry as to damages
before a competent court" and "[t]o grant the amendment would, in our opinion, lead only to
unnecessary delay and expense." Id. at 296.
53 See Carney v. Preston, 683 A.2d 47, 55 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (finding that reasoning of
Justice Stone necessarily prevails over the majority); Caudle v. Swanson, 103 S.E.2d 357, 365
(N.C. 1958) ("The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in the Dimick case [is] a convincing
and closely reasoned opinion supported by ample authority, and concurred in by three eminent
jurists.
...
);Genzel v. Halvorson, 80 N.W.2d 854, 859 (Minn. 1957) ("[W]e think that the
better authority [was] expressed by Mr. Justice Stone's dissent in Dimick v. Schiedt.
...
);
Markota v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 97 N.E.2d 13, 18 (Ohio 1951) (arguing Dimick majority
unconvincingly "dodges" inconsistencies pointed out by dissent). But see Supinger v. Stakes, 495
S.E.2d 813, 816 (Va. 1998) ("[W]e find the reasoning in Dimick v.Schiedt persuasive." (citation
omitted)). Although the court in Supinger agreed with the majority in Dimick that an additur
award is an amount not assessed by the jury, the court approved an additur process that operates
on the plaintiff's consent. Id. at 817. Moreover, the court in Supinger, as Justice Stone did in his
Dimick dissent, qualifies its analysis in light of the practical benefits of additur: "This conclusion
is not meant to disparage or discourage the laudable goal of judicial efficiency that the utilization
of additur promotes. Rather, this decision is limited to what procedure is necessary to render the
additur process constitutionally sound." Id.
54 Freeman v. Wood, 401 N.E.2d 108, 110-12 (Mass. 1980) (holding additur permissible
under State Constitution); Genzel, 80 N.W.2d at 859 (same); Drummond v. Mid-West Growers
Coop. Corp., 542 P.2d 198, 205-08 (Nev. 1975) (same); Fisch v. Manger, 130 A.2d 815, 823
(N.J. 1957) (same); Caudle, 103 S.E.2d at 366 (same); see also Af/arkota, 97 N.E.2d at 18-19
(reasoning arguments sustaining constitutionality of remittitur apply equally to additur).
55 Jehl v. S. Pac. Co., 427 P.2d 988, 993 (Cal. 1967) (finding right to jury trial not impaired
by additur). The Jehl court, while focusing on a constitutional analysis, emphasized that practical
considerations including costs and time must factor in to its decision. Id. at 993 n.9.
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authority of those decisions.56 There are states currently prohibiting additur
based on high court decisions that accept the reasoning of the Dimick

court,17 but they are an arguable minority."'
The precise mechanics of and enthusiasm for additur vary amongst
jurisdictions that use the procedure. 5 9 Massachusetts not only permits
additur and remittitur, but strongly endorses the procedures by statutorily
requiring their use before partial new trials on damages can commence. 60

56

See ITT Hartford Ins. Co. v. Owens, 816 So. 2d 572, 579 (Fla. 2002) (Wells, C. J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing Florida refused to recognize additur until
statute authorized it); Dedeaux v. Pellerin Laundry, Inc., 947 So. 2d 900, 903 -04 (Miss. 2007)
(acknowledging decisions finding additur unconstitutional prior to enactment of statute
authorizing procedure); cf Adams v. Wright, 403 So. 2d 391, 394 (Fla. 1981) (finding additur
statute not in conflict with procedural rules for granting new trial). In Owens, Chief Justice Wells
stated:
[P]rior to the enactment of these statutes, judges had no power to increase a jury's
award of damages by additurs, which perforce did not then exist in Florida. In Bennett
v. Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 131 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1961), our supreme court flatly
held that: "[a]lthough we have referred to the additur ordered by the trial judge as
indicating the extent to which he considered the verdict unjust, we do not recognize his
authority to effectuate an increase in the verdict of the jury."
Owens, 816 So. 2d at 579 (Wells, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Beauvais v. Edell, 760 So. 2d 262, 266 -67 (Fla. 2000) (Farmer, J.,
concurring)).
57 Dixon v. Prothro, 840 P.2d 491, 496 (Kan. 1992) (holding additur after second trial on
damages violated plaintiff's constitutional rights); Bohrer v. Clark, 590 P.2d 117, 121 -22 (Mont.
1978) (finding trial court without authority to increase verdict conditionally or otherwise).
58 See David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A
Proposalfor the ComparativeAdditur/RemittiturReview ofAwards for NonpecuniaryHarms and
Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1128 (1995) (noting constitutional claims that additur
intrudes on jury discretion "have been almost uniformly rejected"); Sann, supra note 13, at 16567 ("Although the frequency of use of these devices varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the
remittitur device has been and continues to be employed in every federal circuit, and most state
courts use one or both devices.").
59 Compare Miller v. Chicago Ins. Co., 320 So. 2d 134, 140-41 (La. 1975) (holding cross
appeal of additur or remittitur permitted only where other party appeals), Baudanza v. Comcast,
Inc., 912 N.E.2d 458, 460 (Mass. 2009) (holding no appeal available to party accepting additur or
remittitur), with Dixon, 840 P.2d at 496 (limiting additur to where answers to special questions in
verdict require general verdict be increased), Dedeaux, 947 So. 2d at 908-09 (interpreting statute
as requiring consent of both parties to additur or remittitur), Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v.
N. River Ins. Co., 976 P.2d 1, 19-20 (N.M. 1998) (allowing plaintiff to accept remittitur "under
protest" and appeal).
60 See MAss. R. Civ. P. 59(a) (identifying grounds on which new trial may be granted). The
rule reads in relevant part:
A new trial shall not be granted solely on the ground that the damages are excessive
until the prevailing party has first been given an opportunity to remit so much thereof
as the court adjudges is excessive. A new trial shall not be granted solely on the
ground that the damages are inadequate until the defendant has first been given an
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State courts plainly recognize that, regardless of how the procedures are
employed, the benefit of avoiding costs and delay is equally provided

through additur as through remittitur. 61 Therefore, from a policy
standpoint, the interest of judicial economy is best served by employing
both procedures.62
CURRENT STATUS OF ADDITUR (AND REMITTITUR) IN
FEDERAL COURTS
Despite the Court's tenuous reasoning and dubious historical
support, Dimick remains valid law and additur continues to be prohibited in
federal courts. 63 Remittitur, meanwhile, has evolved into a significant and
widely utilized procedural device.64 Nevertheless, more recent Supreme

opportunity to accept an addition to the verdict of such amount as the court adjudges
reasonable.
Id.

61 See Baudanza, 912 N.E.2d at 463 ("[A]dditur and remittitur serve the beneficial goal of
'securing substantial justice between the parties without the burdensome costs, delays and
harassments of new trials."' (citing Freeman v. Wood, 401 N.E.2d 108, 111 (Mass. 1980)
(quoting Fisch v. Manger, 130 A.2d 815, 818 (N.J. 1957))); Drummond v. Mid-West Growers
Coop. Corp., 542 P.2d 198, 207 & n.8 (Nev. 1975) (likening additur to other post-trial procedures
that efficiently and inexpensively correct verdicts); Dalton v. Herold, 934 P.2d 649, 650 (Utah
1997) ("The objective of an additur or a remittitur is to avoid the delay and expense of an appeal
or a new trial." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Another practical benefit of both additur and
remittitur is that each allows the parties to evade the uncertainty of a new trial by providing a
definite figure on damages. Baudanza, 912 N.E.2d at 463.
62 See Carney v. Preston, 683 A.2d 47, 54 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) ("As a matter of
policy,
even opponents have admitted outlawing the practices [runs] counter . . . to practical
convenience in doing substantial justice and saving expense."' (alteration in original) (quoting
Schiedt v. Dimick, 70 F.2d 558, 564 (1st Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 494 (1935))); Freeman, 401
N.E.2d at 111 (viewing legislative endorsement of additur and remittitur relevant in determining
constitutionality); Genzel v.Halvorson, 80 N.W.2d 854, 859 (Minn. 1957) ("[A] reasonable
appraisal of [right to jury trial] in the light of recognized practice in this state, compels the
conclusion that the practice of using additur is in the interest of the sound administration of
justice.
...
);Graham v. Whitaker, 321 S.E.2d 40, 44-45 (S.C. 1984) (finding additur
appropriately promotes interest of judicial economy).
63 See Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 917 F.2d 1320, 1331 (2d Cir. 1990) ("To this day, the
Court has not questioned the asymmetric treatment by federal courts of the doctrines of remittitur
and additur, despite vigorous criticism of the rule.").
64 See generally Snyder, supra note 38, at 322 (responding to debates over remittitur's
constitutionality). Snyder acknowledges that the "flawed majority opinion" in Dimick has invited
commentary urging a ban on remittitur in federal courts, but notes the following:

[S]ince Dimick, the use of remittitur has increased continuously to the present day. In
fact, remittitur has become so pervasive in American law that one modern treatise
remarked that declaring remittitur unconstitutional would cause a judicial uprooting of
precedent akin to that effected by Erie-Tompkins. Over the last 175 years, remittitur
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Court decisions endorse the flexible Seventh Amendment analysis adopted
in Justice Stone's dissent 65 and some are at least in tension with the Dimick
decision. 0 Justice Ginsburg, in a footnote to her opinion in Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities, Inc. ,67 pointedly remarks that the Dimick dissent
invites "rethinking of the additur question." 68 Subsequent lower court
decisions reflect how that may have cast doubt on the impermissibility of
additur in federal courts. 69 Federal district courts today continue to face
inadequate verdicts, in spite of the Court's inclinations, and the
proscription of additur can translate into an impractical depletion of their
procedural repertoire.70
has evolved from a sparingly-used procedural device into an all-purpose effort to limit
the power of juries, reduce exorbitant damage awards, and promote judicial economy.
Id. at 322-23 (internal quotations marks omitted).
65

See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436 n.20 (1996) (identifying

modem trial procedures that would not exist if Seventh Amendment's meaning fixed at 1791);
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987) (stating Seventh Amendment analysis should not
focus on finding historical evidence); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943)
("[T]he Amendment was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most
fundamental elements ....");see generally Kenneth S. Klein, Is Ashcroft v. Iqbal the Death
(Finally)of the "HistoricalTest"for Interpretingthe Seventh Amendment?, 88 NEB. L. REv. 467,
478-81 (2010) (arguing recent decision on pleading standards compels Court address viability of
traditional Seventh Amendment analysis).
66 See Tull, 481 U.S. at 426 n.9 ("Nothing in the Amendment's language suggests that
the
right to a jury trial extends to the remedy phase of a civil trial.").
67 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
68 Id. at 433 n.16.
Inviting rethinking of the additur question on a later day, Justice Stone, joined by Chief
Justice Hughes and Justices Brandeis and Cardozo, found nothing in the history or
language of the Seventh Amendment forcing the "incongruous position" that "a federal
trial court may deny a motion for a new trial where the plaintiff consents to decrease
the judgment to a proper amount," but may not condition denial of the motion on "the
defendant's consent to a comparable increase in the recovery."
Id. (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 495 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting)).
69 See Tezak v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 33 F. App'x 172, 177-78 (6th Cir. 2002)
(commenting remedy for insufficient damages limited to new trial although liability not issue on
appeal); Talsania v. Kohl's Dep't Store, Inc., No. 05 -3892, 2009 WL 2905449, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept.
10, 2009) (acknowledging Gasperini decision casts doubt on constitutional bar of additur); cf
Hayes v. Cha, 338 F. Supp. 2d 470, 497-98 n.10 (D.N.J. 2004) (construing Gasperini to uphold
proscription on additur).
70 See Brooks v. Youngert, No. 4:03 CV 137, 2006 WL 3759810, at *8 n.2 (W.D. Mich. Dec.
19, 2006) ("[T]he Court finds that the jury's actual damages award simply flies in the face of the
evidence presented at trial. Were it within the Court's power, it would increase the amount of
actual damages awarded to Plaintiff to achieve a ratio satisfactory to Defendants."); Peebles v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 10195(CSH), 2003 WL 21976402, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
19, 2003) ("[Additur as an] alternative remedy lies beyond the Court's power. But it is perfectly
apparent that plaintiff is entitled to a new trial on damages." (citation omitted)); Fox v. City Univ.
of N.Y., No. 94 Civ. 4398(CSH), 1999 WL 33875, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1999)
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ANALYSIS
Seventh Amendment Protection and Dimick
The distinction between additur and remittitur set forth by the
majority in Dimick is largely criticized by commentators and courts. 71 It is
commonly regarded as strained rationale for inconsistent treatment of like
procedures and dissonance with past constitutional analysis. 72 Some
commentators even speculate that it is fabricated justification
for advancing
73
era.
that
during
vogue
in
agenda
political
conservative
a
Regardless of the majority's underlying interests, its argument that
the jury, by announcing a particular damage amount, tacitly approves lesser
amounts and rejects larger amounts as untenable. 74 It relies on an
erroneous inference that the amount awarded by the final verdict is an
accumulation of jury deliberations over all other amounts. 75 In reality, the
jury returns a verdict without details on deliberations and both increasing

(acknowledging additur as appropriate but unavailable remedy).
It follows that, even in a diversity case presenting only state law claims, a federal trial
judge cannot make an order of additur, even though his state court colleague could.
The reality is that, unless and until the Supreme Court overrules Dimick v. Schiedt, a
state
statute ... cannot trump the United States Constitution.

Fox, 1999 WL 33875, at *11.
71 See Carlin, supra note 13, at 29 ("The commentators seem to be agreed that the minority is
correct in rejecting the validity of the majority's attempted differentiation .... );Sann, supra
note 13, at 178 ("The dissenters in Dimick had the better position both in logic and in
constitutional analysis."); Snyder, supra note 38, at 322 (arguing subsequent Supreme Court
decisions and scholars' works legitimize dissent); see also supra note 53 and accompanying text
(discussing persuasive impact of Dimick dissent's criticisms of majority).
72 See Carlin, supra note 13, at 27-29 (criticizing reasoning of Dimick as specious
justification for distinguishing remittitur from additur). Carlin argues that the mere approval of
remittitur, a "practice which the whole tenor of its opinion shows that its conscience repudiates,"
casts doubt on the reasoning used by the Dimick majority. Id. at 28.
73 See Bender, supra note 29, at 12 n.60 ("It is somewhat ironic that the validity of additur
was decided in 1935, during a controversial period in the judicial history of the United States
Supreme Court."); Cole, supra note 35, at 183-85 (arguing Dimick decision influenced by
political mood of "era of inverterate conservatism and of a Court with a parochial scope").
74 See Bender, supra note 29, at 32 ("[T]he logical distinction between remittitur and additur
drawn by the United States Supreme Court in Dimick is non-existent."); Sann, supra note 13, at
175 ("A distinction between remittitur and additur on grounds that a remittitur-reduced verdict is
included in the jury verdict while an additur-increased verdict is not so included is specious.");
Cole, supra note 35, at 184 ("[I]t
is only the additur which retains all that was contained in a
jury's verdict, and in both additur and remittitur something is taken away from the litigant who is
relying on the verdict.").
75 See Carlin, supra note 13, at 18 ("[T]o assume that the jury found the reduced amount ...
is to make a false application of the mathematical formula that the whole includes the part.").
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76
and decreasing the awarded amount deviates from that lone verdict.
Moreover, predicating remittitur on the divisibility of a factual finding
within the verdict more logically leads to the irreconcilable conclusion that
the procedure encroaches on the province of the jury as deciders of fact.77
As an outgrowth of the court's power to overturn verdicts as
excessive, remittitur must be considered as addressing a legal deficiency in
the verdict as opposed to mathematically manipulating the substance of the
jury's factual determinations; as an outgrowth of the court's corresponding
power to overturn inadequate verdicts, additur should likewise be analyzed
as a procedural approach to a legal question.7 8 The distinction is nuanced
but important: remittitur operates to remedy excessiveness, not to delete79
excess, while additur operates to remedy inadequacy, not to fill a deficit.
Evaluating the procedures otherwise ignores the accepted and necessary
legal fiction that unreasonable factual conclusions by a jury are questions
of law. "o Thus, remittitur does not retain a portion of the verdict nor does
additur bestow approval on an amount presumably rejected by the juryneither can be persuasively conceptualized in terms of assumptions about
the verdict.8 ' In both procedures, the judge's suggested adjustment is

76

See Sann, supra note 13, at 176 ("The jury does not provide a 'range' of appropriate jury-

found verdicts, with its announced verdict being the maximum in the range." (emphasis added)).
77 See Thomas, supra note 27, at 784-89 (arguing remittitur operates to unconstitutionally
contract jury's role as fact-finder).
78 See James, supra note 2, at 154 (reasoning proper analysis of additur should focus on
relationship between jury and superintending role of court). "In both cases [remittitur and
additur], then, the jury may be said to have exercised their judgment in fixing the amount subject
only to the court's ruling on the legal question." Id.
79 See Carney v. Preston, 683 A.2d 47, 55 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (arguing division between
judge and jury unaffected by additur and remittitur).
[W]hen a judge grants a new trial he determines the verdict of a jury is legally
inadequate or excessive and there is implicit in that decision the "power to determine,
as a matter of law, the upper and lower limits within which recovery by a plaintiff will
be permitted ....
" This is the level of abstraction at which the legal principle set forth
at common law should be gleaned; this is the level where the common law
distinguishes the role of the trial judge from the role of the jury, the question of law
from the question of fact. Remittitur and additur do not change the dividing line; they
merely make available procedural tools respectful of the delineation.
Id. (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 488 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting)).
so See id. at 55 (reasoning that unreasonable factual conclusions by jury become legal
questions justifying judicial control of verdicts). "A factual determination beyond the limits of
reasonable judgment is at law a question of law. This fiction or something strongly akin thereto
must be confessed to uphold remittitur and additur." Id. at 56.
81 See Markota v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 97 N.E.2d 13, 19 (Ohio 1951) ("[I]t would appear easier
to uphold the additur practice because, under it, all that the jury did is sustained. However, under
each practice, the departure from what the jury actually did is consented to by the party
prejudiced by such departure."); Carlin, supra note 13, at 18 ("If the jury had actually found, as a
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That amount

3

is finalized by the consent of the adversely affected party.
The rigid historical analysis employed by the Dimick majority is
also questionable.8 4 While English common-law up to 1791 is relevant,
modern Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that proper Seventh
Amendment analysis is not confined to the eighteenth century. 5 Thus, the
predominant focus in determining additur's constitutionality should be on
its relation to the fundamentals of the right to jury trial and not on common
law antecedents.8 6
Parties are not required to invoke their Seventh Amendment rights
and may resolve claims without a jury trial.8 7 The Seventh Amendment
gives each litigant the right to choose whether a jury will decide the factual
disputes involved in that case. 8 When parties waive this right they are not
sanctioning the use of procedures that would otherwise be unconstitutional,
but instead forgoing a substantive right.89 The benefit afforded by invoking
measure of recovery, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the reduced amount, its verdict
would have been for that amount without the excess.").
82 See Jehl v. S. Pac. Co., 427 P.2d 988, 995 (Cal. 1967) ("If the court decides to order an
additur, it should set the amount that it determines from the evidence to be fair and reasonable.");
Dedeaux v. Pellerin Laundry, Inc., 947 So. 2d 900, 908 (Miss. 2007) ("[I]n arriving at the
appropriate amount of the additur or remittitur, the trial judge should not be bound by... having
to consider the amount which should be added or subtracted from the jury's verdict to make it
legal and no more." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
83 See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 494 (Stone, J., dissenting) ("[I]n neither does the jury return a
verdict for the amount actually recovered, and in both the amount of recovery was fixed, not by
the verdict, but by the consent of the party resisting the motion for a new trial.").
84 See id. at 496 (arguing majority's overreliance on history inconsistent with common
law
principles).
85 See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436 n.20 (1996) (noting
procedures not found at common law that comply with Seventh Amendment); Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987) ("We need not rest our conclusion on what has been called an
'abstruse historical' search for the nearest 18th-century analog."); see also Klein, supra note 65,
at 483 ("The contemporary Supreme Court rejects as essentially absurd an approach of
constitutional interpretation binding future generations to the precise meaning of [the term
'common law'] as it was defined in the eighteenth century.").
86 See Tull, 481 U.S. at 421 n.6 (identifying predominant Seventh Amendment considerations
as "nature of the cause of action and the remedy"). "We reiterate our previously expressed view
that characterizing the relief sought is [m]ore important' than finding a precisely analogous
common-law cause of action in determining whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury
trial." Id. at 421 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)).
87 See FED. R. Civ. P. 3 8(d) ("A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served
and filed. A proper demand may be withdrawn only if the parties consent.").
88 See FED. R. Civ. P. 38(c) ("In its demand, a party may specify the issues that it wishes to
have tried by a jury .... ).
89 See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931) ("[T]he Seventh
Amendment does not exact the retention of old forms of procedure."); Markota v. E. Ohio Gas
Co., 97 N.E.2d 13, 18 (Ohio 1951) ("[T]he defendant can waive that right [to jury trial] which he
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that right is that the party avoids the potential abuses which can arise from
consolidating decision-making power into a potentially corrupt, partial or
incompetent individual. 90
Maintaining focus on the substantive
consequences of a procedure, as opposed to its technicalities, is of
paramount importance in adhering to the underlying purpose of the Seventh
Amendment. 91 The constitutionality of any trial procedure must, therefore,
turn on its relation
to the parties' right to utilize a jury as the decider of
disputed facts. 92 Where a post-verdict procedure renders circumstances
that are more advantageous to a party than those rendered by the jury, that
party has ostensibly avoided abuses at the hands of a lone decision maker. 9
ConstitutionalityofAdditur
The essential function of both additur and remittitur is to cure
legally unsupportable verdict amounts. 94 If the procedures' constitutional
implications parallel each other, as is urged, the arguments sustaining
remittitur should correspondingly sustain additur. 95 To find otherwise
would imply that the plaintiff has a greater right to jury trial than the
does when he consents to pay the additur, just as a plaintiff waives his corresponding right when
he consents to a remittitur." (citations omitted)).
90 See Scott, supra note 3, at 676-78 (explaining guiding principle of right to jury trial). The
original value of right to a jury trial was its function "as a means of preventing oppression by the
Crown" and later as a means to "limit the powers of ...judges." Id. at 676-77. See also Klein,
supra note 65, at 489-90 (speculating flexible Seventh Amendment interpretation highlights
jury's core value as embodiment of citizenry in courtroom).
91 See Gasoline Prods., 283 U.S. at 498 ("[T]he Constitution is concerned, not with form, but
with substance.").
92 See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 425-26 (1987) (finding jury assessment of
civil
penalties not fundamental to preservation of right to jury trial); Henderson, supra note 4, at 336
("[The Seventh Amendment] preserv[es] the substance of the common law trial by jury and
particularly the jury's power to decide serious questions of fact, while allowing rational
modifications of procedure in the interests of efficiency."). In Tull, the Court stated:
The Seventh Amendment is silent on the question whether a jury must determine the
remedy in a trial in which it must determine liability. The answer must depend on
whether the jury must shoulder this responsibility as necessary to preserve the
"substance of the common-law right of trial by jury." Is a jury role necessary for that
purpose? We do not think so.
Tull, 481 U.S. at 425-26 (citation omitted).
93 See Cole, supra note 35, at 185 ("[I]f constitutionality is to be, in the final analysis,
partially predicated on benefit, then additur as well as remittitur is seen to be clearly consonant
with the right to trial by jury.").
94 See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text (examining fundamental mechanics of
additur and remittitur).
95 See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 494 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting) (finding reasoning
sustaining authority to order remittitur "equally applicable" to additur).
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96

defendant.

Although the additur amount is judicially crafted, the actual
amount of the judgment requires the defendant's consent. 97 An argument
that the defendant's Seventh Amendment rights have been violated is
unpersuasive because the defendant is free to invoke his right to a jury trial
by rejecting an additur. 98 The plaintiff is not prejudiced because an
appropriately ordered additur leaves her in a more advantageous position
than the jury did; her damages are increased, and liability and other factual
determinations in the verdict remain undisturbed. 99 Moreover, the
plaintiff s right to appeal the propriety of the additur order assures00that the
additur order was made within "Seventh Amendment constraints."

96

See Freeman v. Wood, 401 N.E.2d 108, 111-12 (Mass. 1980) (arguing incongruent

constitutional treatment of additur and remittitur engenders unfairness); Markota v. E. Ohio Gas
Co., 97 N.E.2d 13, 19 (Ohio 1951) ("To say that the arguments sustaining the remittitur practice
are sound while the corresponding arguments advanced to sustain the additur practice are not
sound, necessarily leads to the absurd conclusion that a plaintiff has a greater right to a jury
verdict .... ).
To invalidate additur while upholding remittitur would create unfairness as well as
anomaly: a plaintiff would have an absolute right to a new trial in the face of an
inadequate jury award, but a defendant in case of an excessive award must submit to a
lesser sum set by the judge and agreed by the plaintiff.
Freeman, 401 N.E.2d at 111-12.
97 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 494 (Stone, J., dissenting) ("[I]n both [remittitur and additur] the
amount of recovery was fixed, not by the verdict, but by the consent of the party resisting the
motion for a new trial.").
98 See id. (stating defendant lacks constitutional objections after formally consenting to
additur); see also Genzel v. Halvorson, 80 N.W.2d 854, 858 (Minn. 1957) (citing cases where
constitutional analysis of additur unnecessary because defendants refused consent to increased
verdict).
99 See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 494 (Stone, J., dissenting) ("The plaintiff has suffered no denial of
a right because the court, staying its hand, has left the verdict undisturbed, as it lawfully might
have done if the defendant had refused to pay more than the verdict."); cf Earl v. Bouchard
Transp. Co., 917 F.2d 1320, 1329 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding defendant unprejudiced by remittitur
order).
100See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 435 (1996) ("[A]ppellate review
[of district court's denial of new trial] for abuse of discretion is reconcilable with the Seventh
Amendment as a control necessary and proper to the fair administration of justice .... ); cf Ark.
Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 74 (1889) (stating defendant faced with
remittitur retains opportunity to argue on appeal for complete new trial); Earl, 917 F.2d at 132730 (evaluating defendant's appeal of remittitur amount).
It should be remembered, however, that, regardless of whether a plaintiff "elects" the
remittitur or "elects" to have a second trial, the plaintiff is made worse off and the
defendant is made better off relative to the situation where the jury verdict is permitted
to stand. Thus, although it has been said that a defendant in these circumstances "has
no option," it does not follow that a defendant is therefore entitled to special
consideration. Moreover, the defendant does have an option. If the plaintiff accepts
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PracticalEffects ofAdditur and Remittitur

Additur and remittitur each reduce the ever-increasing strain on
judicial resources by reducing the total amount of trials, one of the most
costly and time consuming court proceedings.'10 Of course, constitutional

protections cannot be circumvented to conserve resources, but where
justice can be administered in accordance with those protections, judicial
economy and efficiency are interests that cannot be ignored. 0 2 Moreover,
those interests are vital to the maintenance of constitutional protection for
civil juries. 103 Such is the case with the Supreme Court's approval of other
procedures unknown at common law that have been deemed compatible

with the Seventh Amendment, 10 4 and with state courts' approval of
additur. 105
Additur and remittitur orders, from a procedural perspective, are
tantamount to judicially orchestrated settlements between the parties, rather
than reexaminations of the jury's factual determinations. 10 6 In both
procedures, each party may voluntarily abandon rights-the right to reject
the suggested amount and the right to appeal the order-in exchange for
efficiency and finality. 107 In this way, additur and remittitur orders do not

the remitted award, the defendant can appeal ....
Id. at 1329.
101 See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (detailing procedural effects of remittitur
and additur).
102 See Henderson, supra note 4, at 336-37 ("The whole thrust of the history of jury practice,
both before and after 1790, has been toward rationality of decision and economy of motion in the
courtroom.").
103 See Freeman v. Wood, 401 N.E.2d 108, 110 (Mass. 1980) (observing modem procedural
innovations sustain right to jury trial); Meyler, supra note 51, at 599 (arguing flexible
interpretation of contours of Seventh Amendment rights best preserves those rights over time);
Scott, supra note 3, at 691 ("If the ancient institution of trial by jury is to survive ... it must be
something more than a bulwark against tyranny and corruption: it must be an efficient instrument
in the administration of justice.").
104 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (approving constitutionality of modern
procedures).
105 See Freeman, 401 N.E.2d at 110 ("[I]f it were not for such changes, the institution itself
might not have survived; a flexibility or capacity for accommodation is perhaps the secret of its
long life.").
106 See Evans v. Calmar S.S. Co., 534 F.2d 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding acceptance of
remittitur "was the equivalent to a settlement of the action"); see also Dalton v. Herold, 934 P.2d
649, 650 (Utah 1997) ("[A] properly accepted remittitur or additur is analogous to a settlement
agreement."); Graham v. Whitaker, 321 S.E.2d 40, 45 (S.C. 1984) ("In actuality, the import of a
new trial nisi additur or nisi remittitur is a suggestion on the part of the judge of a settlement
figure."); Sann, supra note 13, at 220-21 (suggesting alternative form of "post-trial settlement"
where parties determine damages amount instead of judge).
107 See Miller v. Chicago Ins. Co., 320 So. 2d 134, 136-37 (La. 1975) ("[I]n consenting to the
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supplant the jury function, but instead operate outside the jury's exclusive

province to avoid continued litigation. 108 Even where an appeal is heard
and denied, the burdens on judicial economy and party resources are
typically less than that involved with enduring another trial. 109
CONCLUSION
The logical and historical foundation for the proscription of additur
in federal courts is tenuous at best. Moreover, such asymmetrical treatment
of additur and remittitur is unsustainable because it implies that a plaintiff
has a greater right to jury trial than a defendant. Additur's constitutionality
must be considered in relation to the underlying purpose of the Seventh
Amendment.
Constitutional protection for trial by jury originated as an
institutional safeguard against unjust abuse by removing the power to
decide serious factual disputes from the hands of one individual. However,
the continued vitality of trials as an effective means of administering justice
requires that judicial economy and efficiency be advanced where
constitutionally permissible. Thus, innovative procedural devices that
promote judicial economy must be evaluated with regard to their
substantive effects on the safeguards inherent in jury trials as opposed to

additur or remittitur, a party in effect agrees to promote judicial efficiency by binding himself to a
fixed quantum."); Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 976 P.2d 1, 6 (N.M.
1998) ("[The] procedure generally has the effect of facilitating settlement, thereby enhancing
judicial economy .... finality and repose are achieved because the "risks of a verdict less than the
amount to which the remittitur order has reduced the plaintiff's recovery are ... calculated to
induce most reasonable plaintiffs to accept the remittitur .... (citation omitted)).
108 See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 492 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting) (arguing additur
operates outside province of jury). A trial judge with the discretionary power to deny a plaintiff s
motion for new trial does not abuse that discretion nor prejudice the plaintiff merely "because the
exercise of the judge's discretion was affected by his knowledge of the fact that a proper recovery
had been assured to the plaintiff by the consent of the defendant." Id.; see also Carney v. Preston,
683 A.2d 47, 56-57 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) ("In fixing the damages, instead of directing a new
trial, the Court does not usurp the providence of a jury so much as when it sets aside a verdict and
directs a new trial, which the Court always has the power to do upon proper grounds.").
109 See Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 536 F.2d 536, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding plaintiff
appeal of accepted remittitur strains "already over-extended judicial resources"), affdper curiam,
429 U.S. 648 (1977).
While some cost is undeniably involved in appealing a remittitur order, the incremental
expense is relatively small in view of the fact that the parties will undoubtedly have
already prepared and submitted memoranda of law to the district court. Whatever
effort is required to revise these papers is, moreover, overshadowed by the possible
return if the jury verdict is reinstated.
Id. at 537 n.2.
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their procedural technicalities.
Additur and remittitur each assure that the plaintiff receives a
legally supportable amount of damages, that factual disputes are resolved
by the jury, and that neither party is unfairly prejudiced by a lone
individual. Both extinguish the need for a subsequent trial without eroding
the original trial's safeguard against prejudicial exercise of individual
discretion. The procedures are tantamount to judicially orchestrated
settlements between the parties in light of the verdict as opposed to
reexaminations of the jury verdict. Additur, like remittitur, operates within
Seventh Amendment constraints to increase the efficiency of judicial
administration in the federal courts. Therefore, reconsideration of the
constitutionality of additur is urged.
Joseph R. Posner

